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1. Introduction 
It has long been conventional wisdom that a monopolist can be ade- 
quately controlled with taxes as long as distributional issues are ignored 
[Cournot (1938), Green (1962)]. Although Guesnerie and Laffont (1978) 
show that control with linear taxes is limited by the general nonconcavity of 
the monopolist’s objective function, nonlinear taxes circumvent this problem. 
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the regulation of a 
monopolist with private information. Baron and Myerson (1982) and Gues- 
nerie and Laffont (1984) examine the optimal control of a monopolist with 
superior knowledge about its costs. In such a setting, marginal cost pricing 
must be sacrificed to mitigate the informational rent of the monopolist. 
Clearly, informational asymmetries in practice are not limited to costs. A 
more systematic study of the limitations on control imposed by these 
asymmetries is called for. In this paper we study a monopolist with private 
information about the quality of the good it sells. We use a simplified version 
of the model found in Laffont and Maskin (1986). The monopolist sells a 
good to a large number of consumers who cannot discern quality before 
purchase. Quality is observable after purchase but not verifiable by a third 
party so that warranties cannot be used. Buyers do not participate in the 
market frequently enough for a reputation effect to overcome the informa- 
tional asymmetry. 
Section 2 describes the model and our equilibrium concept. There are 
many equilibria because, in general, the monopolist conveys some of its 
information through the price it charges, i.e., there is a signaling effect. 
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However, as explained in our earlier paper, it is natural to focus on the 
equilibrium most favorable to the seller. In such an equilibrium, the 
monopolist exercises market power not only in the conventional way, but 
through its choice of how much information to reveal through prices. Section 
4 discusses the implications for regulation. 
2. The model 
We consider a single seller endowed with one unit of a consumption good. 
The good’s quality, which is exogenous, is represented by the positive real 
number 0 lying in the set @ ={8i,...,O,), where 158,<... <9,s2. Higher 
values of 8 denote higher quality levels. Ex ante, 8 is a random variable for 
which the probability of Oi is fi. The seller, but not the buyers, observes the 
realization of 8 before trade occurs. 
The monopolist has a reservation value u(O) for the commodity. If p is the 
price at which the seller sells 9 units, its payoff is therefore 
To avoid corner problems we assume here that u(O) is increasing and that 
u(0,) < 1. The seller faces a continuum of infinitesimal identical buyers, each 
with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the form 
04 - 3q* - pq, 
Trade unfolds in two stages. After learning 8, the seller sets a price p (stage 
1). In stage 2, buyers demand a certain quantity of the good q(p), and 
exchange occurs. At that point buyers learn the value of 8. For simplicity, we 
assume that the seller must meet demand at the price it sets. 
A seller’s strategy is a mapping p: @ *R + that associates a price to each 
quality 8. [In principle, p(B) could be a random function, but, as shown in 
Laffont-Maskin (1986), such a strategy is never optimal for the seller. We 
thus confine attention to deterministic functions.] A buyer’s strategy is a 
mapping q: R + -+ R + that associates a quantity to each price. 
We are interested in the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game. A 
PBE is a pair of strategies (p(O),q(p)) and a conditional probability function 
g(O(p) (where g(8 lp) represents the probability that buyers attach to quality 
0 given that price is p) such that 
(i) for all p in the range of p(.), g(. 1 p) is the conditional probability of 8 
obtained by updating the prior (fi) in Bayesian fashion using p(.), 
(ii) for all p, q(p) E arg max, xi (e$I -$I2 - pqM& 1 PI, 
(iii) for all 8, p(e) E arg maxp [pq(p) + v(e)( i -q(p))]. 
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Condition (i) requires that buyers have rational expectations. Condition (ii) 
describes buyers’ optimal purchasing behavior given their expectations. 
Because buyers’ utility functions are quadratic, (ii) simplifies to 
P = T 8igi(Bi ( P) - q(P). (1) 
Finally, (iii) describes the monopolist’s best pricing strategy. It gives rise to a 
set of ‘incentive’ constraints: 
P(@q(p(Q)) + o(@( 1 - 4(P(@)) 2 P(~OMPt~o)) + 4m 1 - cl(P(~“))) 
for all 8, 8OE 0. (2) 
These constraints imply that the following standard monotonicity proper- 
ties are satisfied by a PBE. 
Proposition I. In any PBE, p(B) is nondecreasing and q(p) is nonincreasing. 
Proof: Standard [see Laffont and Maskin (1986)]. 
In view of Proposition 1, we need only impose the so-called ‘adjacent 
upward’ incentive constraint, as long as p(8) and q(p) are monotonic. 
Proposition 2. If p(O) is nondecreasing, q(p) is nonincreasing, and 
P(ei)S(P(ei)) + u(ei)( l - dP(ei))) 
=P(@i+ lMP(ei+ 11) + v(ei)(l -dP(di+ 11)) for all i, (3) 
then all the constraints (2) are satisfied. 
Proof: Standard. 
3. Transmission of information through prices 
The behavior of the equilibrium function p(8) dictates how much informa- 
tion about quality is revealed to buyers through prices. On the one hand, if 
p(0) is constant, buyers learn nothing; on the other hand, if p(B) is strictly 
increasing, buyers can infer quality precisely. 
As in common in signaling models, there are many PBE’s in our game. 
Indeed, there is one corresponding to each possible degree of revelation. At 
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one extreme, there is a ‘no revelation’ or ‘pooling’ equilibrium in which 
P(d) = T 
( > 
T fi for all 8. 
By contrast, there is a ‘separating’ equilibrium in which all information gets 
revealed 
p(@ $4 +u(O1) 
1 2 
and, for all iz2, 
(4) 
where in deriving (4) we have made use of (1) and (3). Similarly, there is a 
complete spectrum of intermediate equilibria. 
In Laffont and Maskin (1986) we argue that, in a variety of circumstances, 
it is natural to concentrate on the PBE that maximizes the seller’s ex ante 
payoff (before 0 is realized). In particular, as long as the seller places 
sufficient weight on future profit, this is the equilibrium that would emerge as 
the long-run steady-state of a learning process in which buyers begin with 
prior beliefs about the statistical relationship between price and quality and 
naively update these over time in Bayesian fashion. Alternatively, the PBE is 
the unique stable equilibrium [in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] 
of a game where the seller can first commit itself to choose from a specified 
set of prices and then trade proceeds as above. Henceforth, we will focus on 
this most favorable PBE for the seller. 
Proposition 3. Zf 61,- ~(0~) . ES nondecreasing in i (i.e., the buyers’ marginal 
utility of consumption increases with quality at least as fast as that of the 
seller), then the PBE most favorabh to the seller is a no revelation equilibrium. 
Proof: Let us illustrate the argument for the case of two quality levels 
0, < 8,. Consider the program 




Because 8,-~(0~) is nondecreasing, the constraint (5) is binding, as one may 
readily verify. Moreover, the solution satisfies q1 >q2. Hence, Proposition 2 
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implies that the solution of this program maximizes the seller’s ex ante 
payoff. Because (5) holds with equality, the maximized value of the objective 
function is less than 
which in turn equals 
(@,-4e,))’ 
4 . 
By contrast, the most favorable pooling equilibrium ex ante maximizes 
T .L(dei - 4) - u(ei)q), 
where we have again invoked (1). But the maximized value of (7) is 
(1 f,(ei-u(ei)))2 
4 ’ 
which is at least as big as (6). Q.E.D. 
(6) 
Proposition 3 has a simple intuitive explanation. When tli-o(Oi) is 
nondecreasing, it is (first-best) efficient for the monopolist to sell more when 
0=0, than when 8= 8,. However, the incentive constraints interfere with 
eficiency; from Proposition 1 we know that q(p(8,)) can be no greater than 
q(p(B,)). Indeed, in a separating equilibrium, the former must be strictly less 
than the latter. A pooling equilibrium has the virtue of eliminating the 
incentive constraint, and, therefore, the requirement that q(p(Oi)) be less than 
q(p(8,)). In fact, these two quantities must be equal, which implies that in the 
pooling equilibrium (relative to the separating equilibrium) q(p(B,)) has 
shifted in the direction of first-best efficiency. 
If 8i-u(Bi) decreases rapidly enough, the conclusion of Proposition 3 may 
fail to hold, and a separating equilibrium becomes best. For example, if 
8, = 1, e2 =5/4, u(0,) =O, and u(O,)= 1, the seller’s incentive constraint (5) is 
not binding, and so the seller can do as well with a separating equilibrium as 
though there were perfect information about quality. 
4. Regulation 
Let us continue to assume that 0 takes on only the values 8i < e2. Suppose 
that a regulator wishes to impose a tax on the monopolist to maximize the 
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expected sum of consumer and producer surplus. Like buyers, the govern- 
ment is assumed not to be able to observe quality directly. Thus, if the tax is 
to depend on quality, it must be imposed incentive compatibility. That is, if 
77_ is the tax when quality equals 8 = 8i, we must have’ 
de1 -d -4oh - ~~ 2q2(e2 -q2)-4wq2- T,. (8) 
The government chooses ql, q2, Tl and T2 to maximize 
C Atei% - td - u(ei)qi - 7J 
subject to (8) (see footnote 1 for an explanation of why the other incentive 
constraint is omitted), 
412cl2- (10) 
Constraint (9) ensures a balanced budget and, in view of Proposition 1, 
constraint (10) is a necessary condition. Notice that the Lagrange multiplier 
of constraint (8) must be zero because, given a solution, we can reduce Tl by 
AT, and increase T, by (fi/f2)dTl, thereby relaxing (8) without affecting the 
maximand or the other constraints. Thus if constraint (10) is not binding, the 
solution to the program entails 
q* = ei - u(e,), i=l,2. (11) 
If Oi-u(Bi) is nonincreasing in i, therefore, constraint (10) is satisfied 
automatically, and (11) constitutes the socially optimal sales levels of the 
monopolist. Notice that, in this case, the monopolist’s private information 
entails no deviation from first-best efliciency. The monopolist is induced to 
produce according to (11) by being (i) given a lump sum subsidy for selling 
q:, (ii) being assessed a lump sum tax for selling q’;, (iii) being assessed an 
‘infinite’ lump sum tax for selling any other quantity. 
If 8,-u(B,) is increasing in i, then (11) violates constraint (10). We conclude 
that the social optimum entails qT = qz = q*, where 
4* = 1 fit4 - 44)). (12) 
This quantity is enforced by a zero tax if the monopolist sells q* and an 
infinite tax for a sale of any other level. 
‘There is, of course, another constraint as well, but thanks to Proposition 2, it is satistied 
automatically. 
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In this second case - by contrast with that when f!Ii--u(Oi) is nonincreasing 
_ the monopolist’s private information does imply a social loss. Interestingly, 
the social second best solution is to ‘pool’ the two types, just as pooling was 
the unregulated monopolist’s most favorable equilibrium strategy. 
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